Marxist Trait of Revisionism: Leszek Kołakowski’s Consistent Transition to Inconsistent Philosophy by Olczyk, Adam
HYBRIS nr 37 (2017) 
ISSN: 1689-4286 
 
ADAM OLCZYK 
UNIVERSITY OF ŁÓDŹ 
 
MARXIST TRAIT OF REVISIONISM: LESZEK 
KOŁAKOWSKI’S CONSISTENT TRANSITION TO 
INCONSISTENT PHILOSOPHY 
 
Introduction 
Leszek Kołakowski belongs to philosophers in the case of whom 
comments on their works almost every time contain some references to 
biographical facts. One of the circumstances of his biography that 
particularly attracts people's attention and causes moral judgments is 
Kołakowski's ideological conversion, especially his youthful Marxist 
involvement. For example, recently there was a significant political 
argument in Radom, the city he comes from, about putting a monument 
of Kołakowski on the city’s square because of his early communist past 
(Ciepielak, 2016). 
In this article I intend to describe theoretical reasons that stood 
behind Kołakowski's transition from being an orthodox Marxist to 
becoming an actual leader of the Polish revisionist movement. This 
issue was elaborated before, however, always in the context of the 
change that the young author had undergone, while my intention is to 
concentrate on the aspects of his thought that did not change, the ideas 
that were common to the young author of Sketches of Catholic 
Philosophy1 and to the creator of an opposition between a priest and a 
jester. For I assume there are some noticeable joint threads of these two 
phases of his creativity, motifs that so far have not been interpreted in 
this way, some ideas that Kołakowski constantly approved of and that 
remained valuable for him also after his transformation in the 1950s. 
                                                 
1 The titles of Kołakowski's works published before 1955 are translated by the author, 
the next ones, from the period 1955-1957 – by George L. Kline (Kline, 1971, p. 239-
250); all remaining – by the authors of particular translations. 
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I also try, as far as it is possible, to pass over Kołakowski’s 
biography (understood as a set of life events). I want to avoid all the 
attempts to value his actions, I skip all psychologizing efforts to explain 
the reasons of his stepping into Marxism and, consequently, abandoning 
it. The aim of this paper, then, is to show that the revisionist thaw was 
not only contrary to a soulless system (as it is usually presented), but 
also was the consequence of the development of Kołakowski’s thought 
that genuinely, in some important part, stood unchanged. There is 
something that may be called the core of his philosophy. 
I am aware that such attempt may be interpreted as some kind of 
absolution of Kołakowski’s early writings, because the ideas I link with 
him do have rather positive associations. Answering to that I can just 
say that basically people choose (consciously or not) righteous ideas to 
lead them through their lives. The circumstance that someone 
proclaims and follows noble slogans is morally irrelevant as long as 
they are generally described and considered regardless of practice. And 
this is the way I want to present three basic traits of Kołakowski's early 
papers. 
 
Inability of completability 
First of the major features of whole Kołakowski’s thought can be briefly 
described as ‘anti-code’. The basis of this idea was clarified in the article 
from 1962 titled Ethics without a Moral Code (Kołakowski, 1971), but, 
as a matter of fact, objections against the notion that it is possible to 
create such a theoretical concept that solves all philosophical problems 
and leaves people without inconvenient doubts were presented by 
Kołakowski since the beginning of his scientific and public activity. He 
never stopped being against all philosophical stagnancy broadly 
defined. In the Marxist stage he preferably applied his objections to 
science, that is he opposed something that may be called 
'completability', that is, a finiteness of science. Later, at the revisionist 
phase, his recommendation of inconsistency concentrated on the moral 
part of life (the article mentioned above, Ethics without a Moral Code, 
refers only to moral issues), however the core of his considerations 
remained the same, i.e., the rejection of all types of monism. 
And so, in 1949 in one of his first articles Kołakowski – a 22-
year-old Polish socialist – pointed out the advantages of Marxism, 
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adjudged by him as a ‘philosophy of common sense’ (Kołakowski, 
1949b, p. 4). He already announced that this philosophy did not sanctify 
prevalent tradition and basically was a fight against mental comfort and 
opportunism. Besides, it could lead to the rejection of the most 
ingrained convictions. At the end of the paper Kołakowski concluded: 
“There is nothing in the work of Marxist classics that Marxism would 
not rule out immediately, if scientific studies prove it is a lie” 
(Kołakowski, 1949b, p. 5)2. 
Marxism was never interpreted by Kołakowski as a finite system, 
even when he basically focused on its criticism. Moreover, one of the 
primary objection he formulated in Main Currents of Marxism referred 
to the ambiguity of this philosophy, to the fact that Leninism and 
Stalinism could have been derived from the works of Marx without 
distorting his thought (Kołakowski, 1978, p. 526). Evidently, young 
Kołakowski was not a follower of a statement that various types of 
philosophizing are equal (in point of fact he never made such 
judgment), furthermore, he was a supporter of coercing people to 
Marxism, as he said once, he did not see himself as a democrat 
(Kłoczowski, 1994, p. 21). Crucial thing is that what attracted him to 
Marxism was its flexibility, a contrary to the sanctified tradition. What 
was important for the young author and what he used to underline, was 
that Marxism was not an epiphany (Baczko, Kołakowski, 1954, p. 84). 
Kołakowski claimed it was based on science, that it took into account 
scientific achievements, and that, like in the case of science, its principle 
was the capacity of autotransgression. 
It all sounds maybe a little bit naive and obvious for people living 
in the 21st century. Firstly, we all know how the disseminating of 
Marx's theory went in practice. Secondly, the requirement to include 
scientific discoveries seems to be natural and necessary in every 
respectable modern philosophical theory. It seems that nowadays all 
philosophical outlooks must maintain some correspondence to 
advances in science and technology, at least if their adherents intend to 
keep an elementary connection with prevalent fundamental worldview 
intuitions. However, things looked differently in the 1950s Poland. 
Kołakowski’s works from that time were basically focused on a 
fight with Catholic Church, especially with neo-Thomism. Considering 
                                                 
2 Translated by the author. 
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the relationship between science and religion he concluded that the 
creed of the Church reminded a smokescreen. In line with scholastic 
reasoning, both of them, science and religion, are the sources of truth, 
but they differ in the method of argumentation (Kołakowski, 1955a, p. 
18-20). They have something in common: some divine truths cn be 
proved rationally. That is how, in Kołakowski's opinion, the Church 
affirms science and confirms its unparalleled achievements: by 
announcing that there is no contradiction between a statement based 
on knowledge and a statement based on faith. But in a clash, the second 
one must always be approved as a determining criterion (details of this 
notion were presented in the article Neo-Thomism in Conflict with the 
Progress of the Sciences and the Rights of Man (Kołakowski, 1955a)). For 
young Kołakowski it was one of the ways to show how the Church tried 
to preserve its impact and how it basically subjugated science. 
Therefore, Marxism is a philosophy based on emancipation 
(Baczko, Kołakowski, 1954, p. 84). It is free from mystifications and 
distortions caused by class struggle and religious notions. It is more a 
negativity than an actual statement, and the task of Marxism is to create 
conditions for unrestricted development of philosophical thought 
(Baczko, Kołakowski, 1954, p. 84). Furthermore, in 1954 at the Polish-
German Conference concerning the methodology of the history of 
philosophy Kołakowski, in concord with Bronisław Baczko, pointed out 
two crucial dangers of the prevalent stage of ideological battle. The first 
of them was the a priori  rejection of the achievements of  philosophical 
doctrines that cannot be defined as materialistic (Baczko, Kołakowski, 
1954, p. 84-85). 
Kołakowski did not change his view on this point even when his 
works began to fit into the revisionist movement. When in 1957 he 
summarized the International Philosophical Meeting in Warsaw he said 
that Marxism was not any more a homogeneous doctrine and it 
assumed the possibility of accepting incompatible statements based on 
Marxist tradition. Moreover, the inflexible division into Marxists and 
non-Marxists lost its meaning and could be kept only from the point of 
view of dogmatic orthodoxy, and that the phrase 'borders of Marxism' 
became unreasonable and useless (Kołakowski, 1957a, p. 224). 
Kołakowski made similar remarks  in The Permanent vs. Transitory 
Aspects of Marxism, where he qualified all the disputes, in which 
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participants aimed to practice 'real' Marxism and monopolized for 
themselves an honorable title of 'consistent Marxists’, as  sterile 
verbalism (Kołakowski, 1968b, p. 183). As he noticed in this essay, 
there was no such a thing as one and only truly Marxist interpretation 
of any kind of philosophy and that the use of the same general rules of 
Marxist historical methodology could lead to various conclusions. 
Similar reasoning was presented in his other works from that period. 
For example, in Intellectuals and the Communist Movement Kołakowski 
pointed out that the fetishization of Marxism turned it into a toxin of 
intellectual life, instead of its blood – by that he meant that a theoretical 
work cannot be useful for a revolutionary movement if it was bound by 
anything else than an aspiration to get some authentic knowledge and a 
scientific rigor (Kołakowski, 1968a, p. 172). In What do Philosophers 
Live on? he stated that materialism in science is rather a scientific 
attitude than a doctrine (Kołakowski, 1957d, p. 19). What is 
noteworthy, in that time Kołakowski also started to limit the use of a 
communist terminology. He replaced it with  such terms like 
'rationalism' (Irrationality of Rationalism), 'consequence' – as a contrary 
to inconsistency (In Praise of Inconsistency), or 'a philosophy of an 
absolute' (The Priest and the Jester). It was a clear advancement, a move 
from a follower of a doctrine to a free thinker, not restricted by any 
dogma. 
This feature characterized all Kołakowski's future works. Since 
the abandonment of Marxism he has never been seduced by any 
worldview, although he did not discredit at all an attachment to 
philosophical concepts that intended to say something total and overall 
about being. His mature philosophy is somewhere in between. 
However, Kołakowski remained dissatisfied for the rest of his days 
because a third option, an everlasting non-completion constantly 
troubled him and stimulated his metaphysical and ethical inquires. 
There are three significant works on that matter: The Presence of Myth 
(1972), Religion: If There Is No God (1982), Metaphysical Horror (1988). 
In the preface to the first of them Kołakowski quoted William Blake. 
Those words may be used as a conclusive summary of Kołakowski's 
biggest trouble: 'Less than All cannot satisfy Man' (Kołakowski, 1989, p. 
XII). 
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Involvement 
Kołakowski not only interiorized the Marxist requirement not to limit 
philosophy only to theorizing but also practice it, but he also discussed 
this idea in his works. In other words, he did not only factually practice 
Marxism by his political involvement, but also was writing about the 
importance of engagement. The necessity of taking some actions, 
connected with intensively felt responsibility, is inherent in whole 
Kołakowski's thought. Sometimes it is mentioned evidently, sometimes 
its presence is indirect. Although the findings of Kołakowski's later 
works are faraway from hopefulness and may be summarized by the 
word horror (Kołakowski, 1988, p. 21), Polish philosopher does not 
take giving up as an option. His philosophy frequently does not openly 
oppose passiveness – such an attitude is just passed over, it is ignored 
because of its obvious barrenness. Therefore, statements about the 
nihilist reasons of Kołakowski's accession to communism, presented by 
Jan Tokarski in The Presence of Evil, should be considered as correct 
(Tokarski, 2016, p. 35-41). Tokarski – using partly Kołakowski's 
method of philosophizing (in the aspect of showing schizophrenic 
feature of human wishes (Kołakowski, 1986, p. 13) – points out that 
Marxism offered a collective nihilism, which differs from other versions 
of nihilism because the act of rejecting the existing world lets people 
keep the faith that it is possible to thoroughly fix the reality (Tokarski, 
2016, p. 36). 
In Ethics without a Moral Code Kołakowski binds the idea of 
responsibility for worldly debts with an act of not committing suicide 
(Kołakowski, 1971, p. 154-155). And yet, the refusal of repayment is 
vividly present and it takes two ideological forms: the nihilism of the 
adolescent and the conservatism of the old man (Kołakowski, 1971, p. 
156). The pragmatic mettle in the first stage of Kołakowski's intellectual 
growth was the cause of his concentration on the second form. Nihilists 
are not a real threat as long as they do not grow in number. Besides, 
their attitude basically rules them out of public involvement. Therefore, 
Kołakowski's main intellectual opponent became the Catholic Church 
and the outlooks connected with it, i.e., neo-Thomism and Christian 
personalism in particular. 
Kołakowski used to raise many objections against Catholic 
philosophy. One of the major one aimed at the passive attitude 
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contained in a religious message. Kołakowski amalgamated Christian 
ideas with the recommendation to accept habitual passiveness. In his 
opinion all religious ideologies make a promise that some earthly 
sacrifices will be paid out in the other world, but at the same time these 
doctrines demand to relinquish all corporeal claims (Kołakowski, 
1955a, p. 31). Thomism therefore extends beyond this rule because it 
basically sanctifies the hierarchical rules of society, thus it particularly 
establishes itself as an ideological instrument of the monopolistic 
capital. 
The issue of hierarchy founded in the Thomistic philosophy 
dared and provoked Kołakowski in those years. Young philosopher 
referred to it in his major works, such as: On So-called Thomist Realism, 
“The Rights of the Person” versus the Rights of Man: The Essential 
Meaning of “Christian Personalism” or The Labour Question in Vatican 
Political Doctrine: On the Pope's So-called “Social Encyclicals”, gathered, 
among others, in a book titled Sketches of Catholic Philosophy 
(Kołakowski, 1955c), published in 1955 (however, it includes works 
written in the years 1950-1955). The core of this idea, originated in 
Aristotle (Kołakowski, 1955b, p. 147), is that God predicted proper 
space for each being in the universe. Man is not only not allowed to 
change it, he is essentially unable to make such modifications. At the 
same time God's will sanctifies schemes necessarily connected with 
such values like prevailing class system or private property 
(Kołakowski, 1955b, p. 188-193). Therefore, all attempts to change the 
social order are considered not only as cases of offense against human, 
temporary law, they must be treated as sins, outrages of the natural or 
even eternal law. Kołakowski's reasoning in this case frequently was 
not sophisticated. For instance, he suggested that the meaning of 
Thomism is better understood if we replaced the word ‘God’ by the 
term ‘Church’ (it is a reference to Holbach (Kołakowski, 1955a, p. 13)). 
After such an operation all of Christian efforts to protect its traditional 
values, the conservative mettle, are nothing more than bourgeois and 
reprehensible tries to keep the domination of capitalists and they 
cannot be seen as something different from the desperate acts of 
delaying the social revolution. 
Kołakowski binds in this way the Catholic philosophy with a call 
to passivity. The only alterations that Thomism affirms refer to the 
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changes of inward qualities. They happen in a spiritual dimension but 
do not effect a society as a collective. Marxism – as a pragmatic social 
philosophy – is in this view an actual antithesis to religion, the best 
antidote to the tremendous disease caused by this widespread opium. A 
historian of philosophy should not be a chronicler, the history of 
philosophy is not a remembrance of the past – it is an experience which 
should be used in an effective fight for ideological transformations 
(Baczko, Kołakowski, 1954, p. 78). Communism is presented, therefore, 
as a successor of the noblest aspirations of human kind, all the people's 
dreams about happiness and freedom and also – what is most 
important – it breaks off with the domain of wishes that always ended 
up in disappointment (Kołakowski, 1950, p. 291-292). All of what used 
to be a dream may finally be achieved. Kołakowski used a biblical 
metaphor: the word may ultimately become flesh (Kołakowski, 1950, p. 
292).  
In 1957 Kołakowski published World-View and Everyday Life, a 
set of dissertations written in 1955-1956 (Kołakowski, 1957c). The title 
of this book properly summarizes the pivotal tension of included 
articles; they basically refer to the relationship between philosophical 
outlooks and daily life. Kołakowski's answers are clearly presented 
from the revisionist point of view. In the opening essay Kołakowski asks 
what do philosophers do for a living. He specifies that he means the 
social function of philosophy as some knowledge about the world, i.e., 
its practical power (Kołakowski, 1957d, p. 8). His answer depends on 
matters that philosophers deal with. Trying to find out what is the real 
determinant of philosophical problems Kołakowski says that it is a 
reference to the formation of the social and moral attitudes of human 
(Kołakowski, 1957d, p. 15). Philosophical knowledge is anthropocentric 
accordingly. Every fact may be a subject of philosophical reflection but 
it actually happens only when a practical and human meaning of a fact 
is discovered (Kołakowski, 1957d, p. 24). In other words, a 
distinguishing feature of philosophical thinking is the fact that its axis is 
marked by social practice of humans acting as moral subjects 
(Kołakowski, 1957d, p. 23). 
The practical aspect of Kołakowski's works created at the 
revisionist and the next stages of his life is easy to spot. Since the 
revisionist phase one of the major issue of his philosophy has been the 
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problem of the lack of connection between ideological conviction and 
daily life practice. Kołakowski paid attention to the fact that a 
conversion from being a Christian to being a Marxist did not necessarily 
lead to the change of a moral attitude (Kołakowski, 1957b, p. 34). The 
other problem is that even if any desirable attitude was commonly 
present, a sin would still not be removed from the world. People may 
actually know (not only suspect or believe) that it is forbidden to lie but 
they still may avoid telling the truth. Adam and Eve are an example: 
they had certainty no man ever had, God himself told them what is good 
and what is evil, and yet, they still did not listen to his command and 
committed the original sin. The final answer Kołakowski submitted was 
that only religion outlook made a complete offer, whereas what people 
know about the world actually made an effect on their behavior 
(Kołakowski, 1982, p. 174-178). This statement, naturally, only deals 
with the first problem, the one referring to moral attitude. The 
impossibility of avoiding the evil and getting rid of everything that is 
wrong seemed obvious to Kołakowski, at least since he had noticed the 
utopian attributes of Marxism, which happened more or less in the 
early 1950s. 
Kołakowski repeatedly pointed out that knowing that it is 
impossible to completely achieve most valuable ideas is not a sufficient 
reason to claim that the difference between following or not following 
them is meaningless (Kołakowski, 1975, p. 81). Even if people have 
never reached perfect democracy there still is a qualitative distinction 
between modern liberal democracies and historical totalitarian states. 
People have an intuition of deficiency when they hear that the 
difference between earnings of Rockefeller and a dustman is only 
quantitative. According to political philosophy, the impossibility of 
achieving utopia does not mean that our tries to change current 
conditions are worthless and morally irrelevant. 
Taking this into account, the majority of his revisionist papers 
focuses on pragmatic advices that are ethically formed. Kołakowski did 
not only write and present philosophical considerations – he gave 
homilies, trying not only to convince, but also to heat people's hearts. 
And so, in Intellectuals and the Communist Movement (1956) Polish 
philosopher makes an appeal to intellectuals, he calls them to fight: 
firstly, for the secularization of thinking, secondly, against pseudo-
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Marxist mythology and bigotry, thirdly, against religious and magic 
practices, fourthly, fight for rebuilding respect for unrestrained secular 
reason (Kołakowski, 1968a, p. 165). In Responsibility and History (1957) 
Kołakowski tries to find some way out from two attitudes: a 
revolutionary and a clerkish one, telling that the recommended pose is 
to make efforts leading to ideological renaissance of the revolutionary 
Left (Kołakowski, 1968c, p. 97), specifying what does it precisely mean, 
and what actions does it need. And yet, the best summary of the 
practical intentions of Kołakowski's revisionist articles is given in his 
own words at the end of the famous essay written in 1958: 'So much for 
praise of inconsistency. The rest cannot be verbalized. The rest must be 
done' (Kołakowski, 1964, p. 209). 
It is noteworthy that the basis of Kołakowski's intentions to 
influence people's morality by convincing them that both social and 
internal (necessarily bound with the social) modifications are not only 
possible but also desirable did not change. He tried to adapt his though 
to alterations (aberrations) of the communist system. It shows in his 
attempt to tell apart two senses of Marxism: the formal one and the 
intellectual one. In Permanent vs. Transitory Aspects of Marxism (1957) 
Kołakowski clearly expressed that the institutional way of 
understanding Marxism, which the communist party used to impose, 
threatened the meaning that was philosophically valuable (Kołakowski, 
1968b, p. 187). Someone, who treated teachings of Marx seriously 
(especially in his youth), must not allow ossification of his philosophy; 
must constantly reject all the efforts to ensure existential calm 
(Kołakowski 1971, p. 164); should not be a priest but a jester. As 
Kołakowski told us about a jester: “[he] must stand outside good society 
and observe it from the sidelines in order to unveil the nonobvious 
behind the obvious, the nonfinal behind the final; yet he must frequent 
society so as to know what it holds sacred and to have the opportunity 
to address it impertinently” (Kołakowski, 1968e, p. 34). Kołakowski's 
vision of Marxism remained the same; he just had to reply to the 
interpretation that the Polish People's Republic imposed on Marxism in 
those years. 
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Philosophy of disagreement 
The last issue, the distinction between a priest and a jester, effects 
another constant feature of Kołakowski's thought–its antithetic 
attitude. This notion shows up in any attempt to synthesize his work, to 
give it a frame, a label, and summarize it, for the author of In Praise of 
Inconsistency never intended to create something that could be called a 
philosophical system, a complete theory. He was, as Barbara Skarga 
once joked, a kind of a skeptical metaphysician, or rather–a 
metaphysical skeptic (Skarga, 2002). His philosophy–if we agree that it 
is possible to speak about Kołakowski's philosophy at all – was by 
definition, inconsistent. Nonetheless, there are quite a few efforts that 
expose main currents of his works, and they do it successfully. 
One of the cores of Kołakowski's papers should be defined as an 
intense feeling of disagreement with the existing, prevalent conditions. 
If there is something that Kołakowski owes to Marxism it is a method of 
combining two seemingly opposing options and showing his 
annoyances connected with both of them. As his thought is anti-
monistic, he does not intend to find some synthesis, so in this respect he 
opposed dialectical tradition. And yet, his assumption that most 
philosophical worries can be enclosed within two extremes is a 
genuinely derivative of dialectical materialism. Kołakowski usually 
stands against both extremes. 
There is a popular citation from Aristotle's Metaphysics that 
philosophy begins in wonder. Traditionally this excerption is 
understood as an expression of delight of the world that surrounds us. 
This enchantment is a source of investigations that tend to cognize the 
mystery, magnificence and complexity of reality. The works of 
Kołakowski do not contain such affection. The foundation of his 
philosophical activity is a sense of disagreement, a feeling that there is 
something genuinely iniquitous in our perception of the world. 
Moreover, Kołakowski's philosophy is more diagnostic than 
therapeutic. He tells people about their diseases, furthermore, he points 
out the causes but is incapable to indicate a solution, and at most he 
teaches how to avoid a growth of disorders. 
Hereby Kołakowski usually is presented as a historian of ideas 
(he even is commonly included into a group of Polish historians of ideas 
called Warsaw School of the History of Ideas (Walicki, 1984)), a skeptic, 
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and a critic. He is a jester, so he needs a good society that he may 
undermine and laugh at. Kołakowski is also a moralizer, he wakes 
people up from a blissful state of certainty, pointing out that in the case 
of moral issues man must never lose vigilance. In his opinion the 
purpose of ethics is to generate sinners that are aware of their 
wickedness, and not to produce saints who are certain of their own 
saintliness (Kołakowski, 1971, p. 175).  
This description is appropriate in reference to Kołakowski’s 
books and articles written after revisionist stage, but the indicated 
features occurred as well in Kołakowski's first works. In some 
descriptions of the beginnings of philosophy in Poland after World War 
II it is noticed that professional writers specialized in attacking 
particular concepts and their authors. For example: Adam Schaff 
intended to criticize the philosophy of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, 
Bronisław Baczko fought especially against Tadeusz Kotarbiński, 
Henryk Holland against Kazimierz Twardowski and his school, Tadeusz 
Kroński against Roman Ingarden and Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Robert 
Zimand against Stanisław Ossowski (Chudy, 1990, p. 132). 
Kołakowski's target was widely settled: apart from assaulting 
Ajdukiewicz, Tatarkiewicz, and Ingarden he focused, as it was 
mentioned above, on the Christian tradition represented by scholastic 
philosophy. Even when Kołakowski was writing about Marxism itself, 
he concentrated on the wrong ways of its interpretation and only 
mentioned the appropriate understanding and its commentary (i.e. 
compatible with everything that the Party did and declared). The 
Marxist method was commonly glorified but actually it was not 
adopted. This notion discloses the truth about Marxism and its 
philosophical barrenness that troubled Kołakowski in Main Currents of 
Marxism (Kołakowski, 1978, p. 523-530). The multiplicity of legitimate 
ways of interpreting Marxism does not actually lead to social, political 
and intellectual development, it causes either some kind of dogmatic 
stagnancy or a variety of concepts that keep their validity apart from 
their Marxist sources. 
Kołakowski was aware of the fact that Marxism did not actualize 
its inspiring objective, what was assumed as one of its major goals. 
Quite meaningful are his words in Dialectical impressions, his first 
philosophical publication from 1947, that the principles of materialistic 
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dialectic were brought to life by the work and fight of the labour 
movement in the struggle for better social order more than one 
hundred years earlier, but it is crucial to develop Marxist theory itself 
(Kołakowski, 1947, p. 11). Furthermore, Kołakowski evaluated its 
former development as very poor (Kołakowski, 1947, p. 8). 
And so, it is hard to find an article of Kołakowski written in the 
first, Marxist phase, that would be a solid attempt to expand the theory 
of Marx. Those works are basically polemic and critical. It must be taken 
into consideration that Kołakowski was still a young author, so a lack of 
ambition of creating a resolute enlargement of communist theory – 
even despite a radical nature of his critical works – is easily 
understandable and rather not surprising. 
Revisionism was, by definition, directed towards something that 
should be called 'a proper way of understanding Marxism', so 
revisionists concentrated on disagreement with existing interpretation. 
As Kołakowski himself underlined while defining the term ‘revisionism’ 
in Main Currents of Marxism, it was applied to people, who attacked 
various communist dogmas (Kołakowski, 1978, p. 456). Revisionism 
was a philosophy of disagreement per se. This notion obviously does not 
deprive the revisionists of an ability to create an original, important 
concept, but points out that revisionism is for the Marxist doctrine like 
heresy is for Catholic tenet, it is a derivative supplement, a consequent. 
Ultimately, a revisionist does not try to create, he intends to improve, 
and when he does it, he usually begins with an objection. 
 
Differences 
Marxist 
Trying to point out qualities that certainly changed during Kołakowski's 
conversion from a dogmatic Marxist to a revisionist, I must mention his 
leaving the institutional way of understanding Marxism and beginning 
its intellectual interpretation (Kołakowski, 1968b, p. 174-175). 
According to Kołakowski's words from 1988 main ideas of the 
revisionist movement are based  on respect for: the truth and logical 
arguments, common sense, democratic values, civil rights, economic 
efficiency and 'other venerable things' (however, naturally, revisionists 
maintained the faith that the core of the system should be kept) 
(Kołakowski, 2002, p. 312). These issues were repeatedly described in 
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many earlier works, and it seems there is no need to explain them 
again, however the number or works delineating Polish revisionism is 
not as big as it can be assumed. For the purposes of this article it is 
important to point out and to briefly discuss some of those attributes 
that are relevant for Kołakowski's works and that changed substantially 
since he had become a revisionist. 
First of them is an answer to a question how did he referred to 
the famous proverb, commonly, but not fully accurately, linked with 
Machiavelli’s The Prince: that the end justifies the means. As a young 
author Kołakowski did not evince the sensitivity that characterized him 
later. He recounted his radicalism in the extensive interview with 
Zbigniew Mentzel, saying for instance, that in his youth he did not like 
the camouflages of PPR (Polish Workers' Party), he preferred to name it 
communist, not workers', he was disgusted by the fact that at the 
party's premises there were no portraits of Lenin or Stalin, but of 
Kościuszko, he saw himself as an elite member, who knows things that 
other people were not aware of.  He knew and somehow justified the 
fact that the party cheated people when it acted as if it was not really 
close to communism and presented itself as progressive and patriotic 
(Kołakowski, 2007, p. 78-80). Kołakowski remembered that he had not 
been perceived in the 1940s as an uncertain member of the party, but 
rather as a sectarian, who did not intend to pretend that communism is 
different from what it practically was (Karpiński, Kołakowski, 2012, p. 
215). And from Kołakowski's point of view communism was a tamer of 
Nazism, it was a myth of a better world, a longing for life without crime 
and humiliation, kingdom of equality and liberty (Kołakowski, 2007, p. 
80). This objective seemed to naturally justify all the attempts 
necessary for its achievement. 
Kołakowski focused on the things that sickened him and needed 
to be changed, he saw the reality as degenerate, and this is why he 
believed that bringing some additional evil should not change it 
notably. In his review of Peter Kropotkin's Ethics from 1949 he pointed 
out the necessity of suspending some moral principles: the human 
solidarity could came to life only in conditions that would appear when 
antagonistic aspirations of various classes vanished (Kołakowski, 
1949a, p. 7). Shortly afterwards he noticed that this rule (human 
solidarity) remained in conflict with class struggle and that was why it 
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was so popular among social democratic revisionists (sic). Moreover, it 
is not true that all people are brothers – wrote Kołakowski in 1949 – it 
is merely a wish and a goal of Marxists' aspirations (Kołakowski, 1949a, 
p. 7). Young philosopher seemed to actually believe that a state of 
utopia was available. And if so, it was morally admissible to aim at this 
target by any means. Moreover, it was the obligation of all humans. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that he did not see himself as a 
democrat (Kłoczowski, 1994, p. 21). 
Also, the first phase of his social activity is the only one that can 
be called optimistic. Despite the fact that his works from that time were 
characterized by offensive, sometimes rough and coarse style, their 
reading also leads to a conclusion that everything is going to end up 
well, because such course of events is guaranteed by invariable 
historical laws. In that part Kołakowski was an unreserved Marxist. The 
only question was when this end was going to happen. Marxism was 
then a tragic remedy for one of the features of the world that 
Kołakowski remembered: that it was deeply sad (Kołakowski, 2007, p. 
19). When the reality falsified communists' dream Kołakowski lost his 
hopeful attitude forever. It also roused one of the most significant 
aspect of his philosophical forthcoming creations: a decisive objection 
against all existential and moral complacency. 
 
Revisionist 
To begin the characterization of the revisionist phase I must, once 
again, relate to Ethics without a moral code. It is not an exaggeration to 
say that it is the most prominent essay among Kołakowski's works from 
that period, even a kind of theoretical manifesto. In that paper Polish 
philosopher several times summons 'moral intuition' and its notion 
basically forms some fundamental cohesion in the writings of the 
author of The Presence of Myth. 
The foundation of Kołakowski's communist heresy is an act of 
realizing that the evil does not stop being evil when it contributes to a 
greater good. As he explains, there is no symmetry between obligations 
and values (Kołakowski, 1971, p. 176-178). It means that sometimes 
our duty is to do evil (like stealing food to prevent child's death from 
starvation), but it does not change the moral valuation of this kind of 
actions, a lesser evil is still an evil. This awareness leads to looking at 
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communists' actions more closely, it wakes up moral sensitivity focused 
on the evil in each of its dimension: both in global, social scale, and in 
common, daily life practice. Kołakowski stood up against daily 
mendacity. In The Concept of the Left, one of the classic papers of Polish 
revisionist movement (from 1957), Kołakowski postulated to 
distinguish ideology and current political tactic: the Left – as he 
intended to understand it – did not refuse to compromise with reality 
but at the same time it demanded to call such acts in a proper way, i.e., 
to call them compromises (Kołakowski, 1968d, p. 81-82). The Left 
knows (should know if it really claims to be Left) that sometimes men 
are powerless in the face of crimes but it does not want to qualify 
crimes as good, or profitable. 
Also in this paper Kołakowski accepted that there was no 
possibility to reach utopia, though this acceptance did not allow him to 
conclude that it was pointless to make utopian attempts. For the Left 
excludes utopia from its doctrine like a pancreas discharges insulin. i.e., 
by its innate natural regularity (Kołakowski, 1968d, p. 70). Following a 
target that does not seem to be achievable, with full awareness of this 
fact, makes people sensible to some features of moral situations, namely 
that a rightful goal does not justify all lesser evils. In the paper In Praise 
of Inconsistency Kołakowski specified such experiences, and called them 
‘elementary situations’. What are those? Kołakowski says they are 
'those human situations in which our moral attitude is unchanged 
regardless of the way these situations arrive at their culmination' 
(Kołakowski, 1964, p. 208-209). In other words, they basically are 
moral events, with which we deal when, no matter how notable the 
objectives are, we cannot justify the means (for example: genocide or 
mistreatment of the defenseless). The mention of them is one of major 
differences between a young and a revisionist Kołakowski. They cause a 
descent from the area of ideas to the domain of actual living. They also 
announce – as an exception – ethics without a moral code (as a way of 
Kołakowski's philosophizing, not only a paper), according to which in 
moral life people must always oscillate between various values, which 
cannot be arranged like notches on the thermometer (Kołakowski, 
1971, p. 172). The attainment of a world with perfect ethical code 
would be contrary to some basic moral intuitions.  Every total doctrine 
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is in practice necessarily an inevitable, and moreover, an inadmissible 
moral anesthesia.  
This change in Kołakowski's thinking also manifests itself in the 
subjects of his interest. As a Marxist he concentrated on the attempts to 
frame the world, to describe its rules, to place current events in the 
march of history. However, paying attention to ethical issues, as 
described above (in the excerpt about involvement), woke him from 
'dogmatic slumber'. The fact that Kołakowski recognized that 
philosophic issues were the ones that related to our moral attitude 
forced him finally to abandon Marxism. For – as it has been said in few 
works before – choosing Marxism is not an intellectual but a moral act. 
 
Closure 
The trouble of writing about Kołakowski's method of philosophizing is 
that it is inconsistent. It is based on disagreement and its motive is to 
present two options, both disappointing but for various reasons. 
Moreover, contrary to Aristotle's golden mean, there is no synthetic 
variant for them (Kołakowski, 1984, p. 7). However, as I tried to show, 
there are some currents that invariably describe Kołakowski's 
philosophy. They sure do take general form, but on the other hand, 
taking into account the vicissitudes of his thought, finding them should 
not be adjudged as irrelevant. After all, in some part, Kołakowski never 
fully rejected some strictly Marxist convictions: that human thought 
was continually modified and this process would never cease 
(moreover, all counter interventions were blameworthy), that 
philosophy demanded not only theorizing but also influencing moral 
attitude, that thinkers not only should describe reality, they were also 
obliged to reject all the falsehood present in the world, and to bare all 
kinds of fallacy. The change of the ways these ideas have been clarified 
by Kołakowski is determined, as a matter of fact, by moral 
sensitiveness. For as he pointed out in Education to Hatred, Education to 
Dignity: 'Evil must be part of the world, but woe to him who bears it' 
(Kołakowski, 1990, p. 257). 
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ABSTRACT 
MARXIST TRAIT OF REVISIONISM: LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI’S 
CONSISTENT TRANSITION TO INCONSISTENT PHILOSOPHY 
In the article the author describes theoretical reasons that stood behind 
Kołakowski's transition from being an orthodox Marxist to become an 
actual leader of the polish revisionist movement. His intention is to 
concentrate on those aspects of Kołakowski's thought that have not 
changed, apart from any biographical and psychological reasons. (1) 
First of those features is Kołakowski's inability of completability, the 
anti-code disposition. (2) The second trait is the moral attitude, an 
intention to influence on people's morality by convincing them that 
social and internal (necessarily bound with social) changes are 
desirable; that an existential calm demolishes morality. (3) Third 
feature concerns the fact that Kołakowski did not attempt to create his 
own philosophy, he was rather a historian of ideas, a skeptic, and a 
critic. 
KEYWORDS: Kołakowski, revisionism, Marxism, involvement 
MARKSISTOWSKIE CECHY REWIZJONIZMU: LESZKA 
KOŁAKOWSKIEGO SPÓJNE PRZEJSCIE DO NIESPÓJNEJ FILOZOFII 
W artykule zestawione zostają dwa pierwsze etapy twórczości Leszka 
Kołakowskiego: marksistowski oraz rewizjonistyczny. Wychodząc 
naprzeciw pracom, które dotychczas poruszały tę problematykę, autor 
skupia się na tych przekonaniach polskiego myśliciela, które pozostały 
niezmienne dla każdego z obu okresów, więcej nawet – które wydały 
się leżeć u podstaw porzucenia przezeń marksistowskiej dogmatyki. Są 
to kolejno: (1) systemowa niezakończoność filozofii, jej antykodeksowe 
nastawienie; (2) potrzeba zaangażowania, związana z pomysłem, że do 
podstawowych zadań filozofii należy wpływanie na postawy moralne 
oraz ich odpowiednie kształtowanie; (3) antytetyczność podejścia 
Kołakowskiego, znajdująca istotny wyraz w przyjmowaniu pozycji 
błazna, a także konsekwentne nastawienie na negację zastanych 
propozycji światopoglądowych (tak tradycyjnych jak współczesnych 
polskiemu myślicielowi). 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Kołakowski, rewizjonizm, marksizm, 
zaangażowanie 
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